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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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6-11-11 Mr. Martin

CUH 66711
November 8, 1962

TO: The Secretary
FROM: ARA - Edwin M. Martin

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I agree with the conclusion of the attached memorandum
that Lechuga would be a good channel to use, probably
the best available to us, if it should be decided to
pursue this particular track further.

Attachment:

Memo to Mr. Martin from
Mr. Hurwitch, dated 11/6.

737.57.361
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11-865

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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Memorandum

This document consists of 1 pages
No. 1 of 2 Copies, Series A

TO : ARA - Mr. Martin

DATE: November 8, 1962

FROM : ARA - Robert A. Hurwitch

SUBJECT: Approach through Carlos Lechuga

Lechuga has been with Castro from the beginning. He falls in the nationalist, rather than communist or pro-Soviet category. He is a polished gentleman and a capable diplomat — superior all-around calibre to Garcia Inchaustegui, for example. When Cuba left the OAS post Punta del Este, there was genuine regret on the part of many of his Latin American colleagues to see him, as a person, depart. I understand that his wife is anti-communist and it is possible that indications that Lechuga might defect originate with her.

I think we could be reasonably certain that Lechuga would listen carefully and transmit accurately and discreetly to his principal. I doubt that he would risk making recommendations.

An alternative might be the Canadians. The Secretary hinted broadly in that direction recently to the Canadian Ambassador here.

I am inclined to feel that there may be merit in our going through a Cuban rather than confrontation with Castro through a third party: (1) we could be certain that our pitch had accurately been given to at least one Cuban; (2) Castro might be less likely to react instinctively (i.e., against the proposition); and, (3) if Castro should reject the proposition, at least one Cuban, other than Castro, would have known of our offer and might, under certain circumstances in the future, be able to make use of his knowledge to our benefit.

Recognising that the chances of success are very probably against us, in any event, I believe we have relatively little to lose in an attempt through Lechuga and perhaps something to gain even if Castro rejects the proposal.

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ARA:RAHurwitch:dr

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